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A couple of days ago, I was asked to give an interview
concerning the conference ECHE 2012, the motto of which
was, ‘‘Progress in Health Economics’’. One of the ques-
tions posed to me was, ‘‘What is your vision of Health
Economics 10 years from now?’’ Here is what I had to say.
There are two peculiarities of Health Economics that are
of concern to me and that I would like to see addressed in
the future. One is the often tenuous relationship of the
discipline with general economic theory. Take for instance
risk adjustment (RA) in health insurance, which has
become an industry of its own in the course of the last
30 years [6]. Health economists invariably seek ways to
neutralize the risk selection incentives of health insurers.
However, RA payments by health insurers are not borne by
them but are shifted to the insured under the guise of
increased contributions. The analogy with an indirect tax is
evident, and any standard Economics textbook will point
out that, while an indirect tax is paid by the sellers of a
good, it is effectively borne by the consumers (entirely so
in the long run). In the case of RA, the low risks are made
to pay a contribution in excess of what is justified in view
of their risk profile, while high risks receive an indirect
subsidy financed by the low risks.
However, the analogy with indirect taxation has two
implications. First, as long as RA remains imperfect (i.e., a
situation unlike the long-run equilibrium in the case of a
good traded on a competitive market), the risk-selection
incentives of both the insured and the insurers must be
targeted. After all, the low risks have an incentive to seek
out a health insurer offering them a favorable deal, per-
mitting them to eschew the indirect tax in form of payment
into RA. The high risks do the same, selecting the health
insurer offering them a low contribution thanks to a max-
imum cross-subsidy. This may explain why, at least in
Switzerland, the volume of RA has not ceased to increase,
contrary to expectations that RA would ‘wither away’ since
it neutralizes insurers’ risk selection incentives [2], an
expectation reminiscent of government ‘withering away’ in
the happy Marxist state. Second, when there are two
objectives (neutralizing the incentives for risk selection of
the insurer and the insured in a RA context), the Tinbergen
rule of economic policy states that two instruments are
needed to attain both of them. Therefore, RA is subject to a
kind of impossibility theorem precluding a perfect solution.
Admittedly, it took me about a decade to recognize this [4].
Without doubt, Health Economics will benefit in the future
by reinforcing its ties with general economic theory.
The second peculiarity of Health Economics causing
concern is its overly close relationship with national
institutions and sponsors of research. This occurred to me
for the first time during ECHE 1995 in Stockholm. When
roaming between sessions, I noticed that there was hardly
any overlap between two camps of delegates (this is also
reflected in [7]). One camp comes from countries with a
National Health Service (NHS). There, the discussion
revolves about cost effectiveness, QALYs, and equity. The
other camp is rooted in insurance-based countries; its focus
is on risk selection and RA, moral hazard effects, and the
production of health. Interestingly, the members of the two
camps seem to be quite happy to be among themselves,
presumably their reunion helping them to present their
research to some national sponsor later….
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The long shadow of national sponsors became evident a
few years later when Friedrich Breyer and I submitted the
manuscript of our textbook Health Economics, 1st edn, to
the Oxford office of Oxford University Press. After just a
few moments, the gentle voice on the phone asked me,
‘‘Sir, is this text in any way critical of the UK National
Health Service?’’ I replied, thinking of our rather diffident
review of the efficiency reasons advanced for justifying
government intervention in the healthcare sector in ch. 5,
‘‘Well, at least by implication, this might be so’’. Where-
upon the gentle voice said, ‘‘In this case, may I suggest you
submit your text to our New York office’’. Evidently, a big
(and allegedly independent) publisher like Oxford Uni-
versity Press is afraid of the pressure the NHS might exert
on it.
Some of our discipline’s leading scientific journals have
their editorial offices in the UK, and it seems that they are
influenced by the main sponsor of research into Health
Economics in their country as well. Recently, we submitted
a piece revolving around the measurement of consumers’
willingness to pay for a new diabetes medication to two of
these journals [5]. In both cases, one of the referees without
any further justification claimed the results of this study to
be biased simply because it had been financed by a phar-
maceutical company. They neglected the authors’ written
affirmation that the contract with the sponsor provided for
their full independence in conducting the research. Com-
pare this with a study financed by a government agency,
such as the NHS of a European country. In this case, no
referee would ever think of claiming a bias in the interest
of the sponsor, who would be considered as acting in the
citizens’ interest—as though governments did not cater to
their constituencies in their quest to stay in power and
public agencies, pursue their own agenda in order to
expand their authority, respectively.
This (too) close relationship with national institutions
and sponsors also has a heavy influence on health econo-
mists’ policy advice. The example of RA is again
instructive. Any economics textbook will state the ‘‘price
equal marginal cost’’ rule early on, emphasizing the inef-
ficiencies that are caused by violations of this rule. And in
the event that some consumers are not able to pay the
market price, the recommended remedy invariably is, ‘‘Do
not regulate price but let the market do its work; simply
have the government pay a subsidy to those consumers
who cannot afford the good’’. Only in Health Economics is
this advice neglected. It would call for risk-based contri-
butions to health insurance because the best estimate of
marginal cost is the expected future healthcare expenditure
that comes with enrolling an extra individual [8]. Health
economists have unquestioningly adopted the mantra that
risk-based premiums are unequitable even if combined
with means-tested subsidies, neglecting the textbook
advice that subsidies rather than premium regulation
should be used to achieve equity. Note that community
rating of contributions in fact favors well-to-do individuals
susceptible to moral hazard, such as university professors
who can visit a physician any time they wish. If risk-rated,
they would have to pay far more for their health insurance.
Conversely, community rating hurts low-skilled employees
who do not dare even to leave their workplace to see a
physician for fear of losing their job. In view of their
modest utilization of healthcare services, their contribution
is excessive. This difference in moral hazard effects is
neglected by Kifmann and Roeder [3] in their otherwise
excellent theoretical analysis of the welfare effects of
community rating versus risk-based premiums combined
with subsidies.
Rather than pushing the ‘‘price equal marginal cost’’
rule, health economists have been delving into the exciting
second-best world of RA. The literature abounds with
proposals refining RA schemes, and I myself plead guilty
to participating in this game [1], but see also [2]. However,
a seemingly innocuous fine-tuning of the RA formula can
have unexpected side effects. The adjustment in question is
the so-called Beck formula, which includes the dummy
variable ‘hospitalization during the preceding year’ as an
indicator of high risk (Swiss healthcare providers have
been blocking successfully the transfer of diagnostic data
to health insurers). A particular health insurer commis-
sioned me to simulate the effect of the Beck formula on its
RA payments for the years 2005–2007. Whereas this
insurer had roughly been a zero net contributor, the Beck
formula would have caused it to suddenly pay up to 13 %
of its premium volume into the RA scheme [4]. Since
Swiss social health insurers must not accumulate reserves,
the materialization of this latent liability would have driven
this particular insurer into insolvency, with all the unde-
sirable consequences for policyholders. An in-depth anal-
ysis showed that the cause was not risk selection but
previous efforts (hailed by Swiss policy makers who are
keen to achieve the cost savings promised by Managed
Care) to keep patients out of hospital. The consequence of
this laudable initiative is ‘‘too few’’ hospitalizations, a fact
which importantly enters the Beck RA formula. Being part
of the unpopular Managed Care legislation, the new for-
mula was, however, rejected in a popular referendum held
in June 2012. Since the findings reported in [4] are so much
against mainstream Health Economics, it would have not
been worthwhile even to try to have them published by one
of the field journals.
These examples demonstrate the (scientific and welfare)
damage that may be caused by the two peculiarities cur-
rently characterizing Health Economics, namely its overly
loose ties with general economic theory combined with its
overly close ties with national institutions and sponsors of
570 P. Zweifel
123
Health Economics research. Dear delegates, let me
encourage you to achieve progress in Health Economics by
rectifying both of these weaknesses of our discipline in the
years to come!
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